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REMARKS OF PROFESSOR WILSON
I would like to begin by briefly integrating some previous viewpoints,
drawing upon them in terms of my frame of reference in evaluating the
paper of Professor Oglesby. I will speak in terms of the international
political system and my view of the place of international law within
that system.
First, I would generally accept the views of Professor Forsythe and
several of the other speakers that in the long run self-interest is a pri-
mary goal on the part of the major powers in international situations.
We are well aware that both international law and international organi-
zation reflect the realities of the international political system. The
international legal order does create organization, and in turn interna-
tional organization, through the various organs of the United Nations,
contributes to the advancement of international law. We are also aware
that there is a certain amount of feedback within the international politi-
cal system itself in terms of both international law and international
organization.
Next, trying to be as objective as possible, I shall apply these observa-
tions to the conduct of two major world powers, namely, the United
States and the Soviet Union. A problem arises in this area in that the
precedents established by one bloc serve the opposing bloc as bases for
competitive action. A number of the questionable precedents which have
been set by the United States in international law effectively provide a
basis for competitive action by our adversary, the Soviet Union. This
process works both ways, however.
Also, I think we are aware of the fact that the third world nations
are having an impact upon the relations between the two major blocs.
It appears that we are evolving beyond a loose bi-polar system. I submit
that too frequently this point is overlooked, and I dare say that it has
been overlooked in many cases during this conference.
*Associate Professor of Internationai Relations, American University.
**Professor of Political Science and Dean of the Graduate School, East Carolina University.
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If one attempts to take an objective view of the present world situa-
tion the double standard which prevails must be considered. I have
already mentioned the matter of precedents set by one bloc or the other
in terms of the evolution and development of some type of intrabloc law.
Certainly these precedents are not lost on the third world nations (by
third world nations I refer to the Afro-Asian bloc and to Latin Amer-
ica). That is to say, they operate on the basis of these precedents,
viewing international law as a defense mechanism against the former
colonial powers. At the same time these nations find that these same
precedents do not restrain their conduct in dealing with their own neigh-
bors. Thus, the double standard is not only applied to conduct between
the two major powers or among the smaller and the larger powers but
is also applied to conduct between and among the third world nations
themselves.
The increasing interest in international law and civil strife suggests
that international law is in transition. Problems are posed in terms of
how the United States and the Soviet Union are going to relate to this
transition. Are they going to assist the transition in a constructive man-
ner, or are they going to relate to it in an activist way? In talking
specifically about the two major blocs several differences must be taken
into account. For example, an overview of the intervention by the
United States in Latin America would indicate the existence of a situa-
tion analogous to that of Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe. The
manner in which the United States considers the primacy of the Organi-
zation of American States over the United Nations in terms of cold war
issues within the context of the American sphere of influence, and the
manner in which the Soviet Union supports the primacy of the Warsaw
Treaty Organization and the exclusion of the United Nations from
issues within the Soviet sphere of influence are analogous. Nevertheless,
I submit that there are some qualifications which must be made.
It must be acknowledged that the East European nations are much
more subservient to the Soviet Union than are the Latin American
nations to the United States. Admittedly, in terms of trade and eco-
nomic relations, the East European nations are clients of the Soviet
Union to a certain degree. An effective distinction can be made, how-
ever, in terms of the extent or degree of subservience as regards these
two different spheres of influence. I would suggest that in terms of the
history of the development of the principle of non-intervention, the
cornerstone of the inter-American system enshrined in the Charter of
the Organization of American States, it is a more serious matter when
the United States resorts to intervention within the Western Hemi-
sphere than is intervention by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. This
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is true whether the intervention is under the guise of the Warsaw Pact
or in terms of what the Soviets consider their prerogative within their
sphere of influence.
We are confronted essentially with questions of stability and instabil-
ity and how international law can relate to these questions or play a role
in the process. This consideration is what leads us to the proposition of
intrabloc law and the question of whether such law is developing.
McQuinny was among the first of the many writers since the early
1960's, basing his study upon the Cuban missile crisis, to argue that
there is developing a concept of intrabloc law and an unwritten system
of rules and regulations that would govern the relations between the two
major powers. Eckstein, in his work on internal war, attempted to cate-
gorize three types of civil war. Professor Oglesby concentrated upon the
intervention by the United States in the Dominican Republic and that
by the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia as two of the more contempo-
rary examples of Eckstein's third category: war as social change.
Generally speaking, my reaction to Professor Oglesby's paper is quite
favorable. I would question, nonetheless, the manner in which he arrived
at some of his conclusions. Professor Oglesby raises questions as to the
right of bloc intervention. Is there actually a right of bloc intervention
in terms of contemporary international law, even admitting that con-
temporary international law is presently in a transitional period? Does
bloc intervention contribute to the stability of the international system?
In other words, is such intervention system-serving? Professor Oglesby
submits that bloc intervention is system-serving and contributes to inter-
national stability. I am reminded, from the viewpoint of international
organizations, of certain individuals who subscribe to the "building
blocks" approach to international integration, in many cases arguing
that regionally intergrated groups are the new substitute for the tradi-
tional nation states. Either the negative or positive side of this premise
may be utilized to formulate a position, with either position having
equal forcefulness as regards stability or instability. However, what is
to prevent these emerging regional groups from becoming increasingly
competitive and unstable in relation to the international political sys-
tem? Some might even say that certain of the seven basic principles of
international law and friendly relations and cooperation among states
are incompatible with this evolving concept of intrabloc law. I person-
ally believe that valid arguments could be made that a right of intrabloc
intervention would have a destabilizing effect upon the relations among
bloc-member nations and between the two major powers.
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REMARKS OF PROFESSOR HOWELL
I will leave comments regarding ideology to my fellow panelists, but
I would like to say, as a philosophical matter, that, like many other
people who study this exasperating problem of the legal regulation of
the use of force, I slip occasionally into the euphoric and high-minded
pattern of explaining how it will all come out right in the end. That
approach helps to get through some days.
I prefer to spend most of my time on the law relating to the use of
force, offering as defense for this imbalance on my part the over-all
theme of the meeting. Rather than criticizing any one of these excellent
papers that we have heard, I will make some comments that apply to
all three. Furthermore, some of my observations apply to papers pre-
sented in the earlier sessions. My goal is to suggest some general trends
that relate to the use of force described in these papers.
"Intervention" has been a much-used word here. I will use it also, but
with the reservation that the use of force with which we are concerned
is called by a variety of names. This force is used by general interna-
tional organizations in their relationship with states and by states in
their relationships with other states.
In the past few decades, the United Nations Charter, General Assem-
bly resolutions, new treaties and new interpretations of old law, among
other things, have tended to broaden the justification for intervention
by the United Nations into the affairs of states, by force or otherwise.
In a counter-trend, we have had a narrowing legal justification for the
use of force by one state in its relationships with another state.
First, let us consider the trend regarding international intervention.
Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations declared any war
or threat of war to be a matter of concern of the whole League. The
Charter of the United Nations laid the groundwork for a more effective
use of force by international organs. The limitations of United Nations
machinery are well-known and some aspects have been described by
Professor Donald Piper and others here. I would like to refer to an
aspect of international interference in state affairs that is less known.
This is interference in the general area of peacekeeping where the threat
to international peace is often not very imminent. Human rights cases
and colonial cases are prime examples. Nevertheless, international juris-
diction has been developed in a case by case procedure in these "middle-
range" threats to the peace, and the international organ would be enti-
tled to use force, or could easily declare itself competent to use force, if
the decision-making majorities dared.
International authority can, of course, be increased by new interna-
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tional law. But after 1945, a broader international intervention into the
affairs of states was justified by the argument that potential threats to
the peace created emergency situations requiring or allowing interna-
tional interference. The doctrine of international concern was developed
in the Spanish case and in the early years of the South African debates.
It was not the same "international concern" mentioned in Article 11 of
the Covenant or implied in Chapter VII of the Charter, which strongly
suggest that international concern over a threat to the peace should
result in an international use of force. The later "international concern"
is a concern which allows the international organ to urge peaceful solu-
tions without having to live up to any obligation to use force.
Once this jurisdiction has been established by international concern
in these less serious categories of cases, it would be possible to move to
the use of force. The point is that international jurisdiction has been
broadened and that the international organization could decide to use
force in this broader field.
Of course the Security Council (or the General Assembly under the
Uniting for Peace Resolution) can vote to use force any time the neces-
sary votes can be found. But, as you know, they have been reluctant.
There are many blocks to the decision to use force that need not be listed
here. I am simply suggesting that the decision to use force may be a little
easier to make if the jurisdictional question has been settled for a long
time.
I believe the United Nations illustrated this point by its handling of
the Rhodesian case. I believe that the United Nations agencies became
involved in the Rhodesian case primarily on the basis of new interna-
tional law and before there was serious claim that the situation in Rho-
desia even potentially threatened international peace. It was my thesis
that the situation was finally declared a threat to the peace, not to
establish international jurisdiction, but to give added force to the inter-
national effort to resolve the case. Of course, in the Rhodesian situation
the force was to be used by one member, not the United Nations as a
group.
The question of intervention of one state into the affairs of another
is quite another matter, and, as Professor Ross Oglesby has shown,
intervention in bloc politics is still another. The same terms are often
used, but they mean different things. I will pass over intervention in bloc
situations and deal only with the trend in the law relating to intervention
by one state into the affairs of another state.
Intervention once had a very specific and legalistic definition as it
refers to state action. Oppenheim said: "Intervention is dictatorial inter-
ference by a state in the affairs of another state for the purpose of
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maintaining or altering the actual condition of things."' Quincy Wright
suggested that force had to be used or threatened for the term "interven-
tion" to be applied.2 United Nations intervention does not fit this defini-
tion; it is less technically defined.
Confusion over the meaning of intervention in state affairs increased
after Soviet leaders urged the world community to replace old concepts
of international law with principles of peaceful coexistence. The propo-
sition was attractive to former colonies and underdeveloped states, and
the stage was thus set for an extensive discussion and revision.
During the early negotiations, the label was changed from "peaceful
coexistence" to "friendly relations." This change suggests an answer to
a question that was asked yesterday of Professor Dean Rusk regarding
why the relations had to be friendly. Perhaps the relations had to be
friendly because the coexistence was to have been peaceful.
In its elaboration of the acts which constitute intervention, the Gen-
eral Assembly in 19651 reflected the trend to include activities that
previously had been omitted. In addition to attacking the argument that
some interferences are permissible by prohibiting interventions "for any
reason whatever," it specifically included assistance of any kind to "sub-
versive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent over-
throw of the regime of another state," or interference "in civil strife in
another state." The resolution also states that "armed intervention is
synonymous with aggression." Professor Rusk has already discussed the
full range of friendly relations as that topic was developed in the 25th
session of the United Nations General Assembly. His mention of the
modification of Charter articles by the replacement of the word "Mem-
bers" by the word "State" seems to me to illustrate the extension of
limitations on state use of force.
In summary, a considerable body of rules is developing to detail the
many ways in which one state should not use force against another.
I am not claiming that the listing of powers of international organiza-
tions or the listing of limitations on states radically changes world
events. The international organ still does not use force when its legal
right can be easily established, and states still use force against each
other in defiance of the rules. But, to close on a "high-minded" note, it
does appear that we are at least beginning to move toward a proper
regulation of the use of force if we have set a trend to establish as
1L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 134 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
'See generally Q. WRIGHT, THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ELIMINATION OF WAR
73-76 (1961); Q. WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 9-11 (2d ed. 1965).
'G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
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law-even weak law-that the international organization has expanding
rights to use force while the individual states have a diminishing right.
REMARKS OF PROFESSOR ROAD
The comments of Professor Oglesby are quite valid. He has elo-
quently described a pattern of bloc intervention to prevent social and
political alterations of the governmental structure of a bloc member
which would result in the loss of that member from the bloc. I am not
certain whether this pattern constitutes a law, an observation, or an
excerpt from natural law. Regardless of its categorical placement, the
pattern is one which has been developing over a period of time and is
not altogether new.
It appears that Professor Oglesby has framed his remarks in terms
of ideological blocs. I would suggest, however, that the pattern is a
reincarnation of an ancient rule of law referring to spheres of influence
within geographical areas. This rule has validity and is bottomed upon
the fact that the geographical location of the area of conflict frequently
has significant impact upon the determination of the law or the force
that is used and the outcome of such use.
The United States almost naturally expects to maintain a position of
hegemony over those domains in its immediate vicinity. Perhaps, at
least subconsciously, we recognize that other great powers may have
superior rights of influence and control in areas proximate to them.
Such recognition helps to explain the weakness of the Soviet Union in
Cuba and that of the United States in Eastern Europe. It is also one of
our difficulties in Vietnam. Thus, although the pattern of bloc interven-
tion has been stated here in ideological terms, I submit that the impact
of geography has had a marked effect in these affairs.
Let me turn briefly to Professor Payne's paper on Africa. I am not
sure that the problem he poses is a leading world problem, or that it is
in fact a real problem. Briefly stated, the supposed problem arises as to
the manner of confronting humanitarian intervention by black African
countries in the Republic of South Africa. Frankly, I think there has
been undue concern about this African problem since I do not think the
black Africans take the situation as seriously as we do. Meetings, papers
and resolutions appear to evince an intention on the part of black Afri-
cans to take action; yet they continue to trade with South Africa. The
position I speak from is primarily that of West Africa, which is particu-
larly unconcerned about the problem. I would admit, however, that East
Africa has evidenced some concern over the situation.
A second reason for my position is that most of these black African
nations are incapable of mounting any sort of invasion. For example,
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Guinea once contemplated going to the aid of Ghana, a decision which
would have involved marching across the Ivory Coast; certainly they do
not possess such a capability. There exists small likelihood that an army
could be moved successfully from some of these black African nations
down to South Africa, in some cases a distance equivalent to that be-
tween New York and San Francisco.
My position is based upon personal experience in the fourteen nations
of West Africa. Prior to my visit I took the writings on the situation
there quite seriously, but I soon discovered that in spite of what has been
written, neither the Africans nor the Americans there are much con-
cerned about the problem. These local attitudes merely reemphasize the
implication that we may be concerned here with a problem which is not
likely to arise.
DISCUSSION FROM THE FLOOR
MR. RUSK:
With respect to Mr. Oglesby's analysis of the bloc situation, it was
not my impression that President Johnson felt that he was announcing
a general doctrine or policy at the time of the Dominican Republic
situation from the point of view of the O.A.S. During the Eisenhower
administration, the O.A.S. had imposed sanctions upon Trujillo, whose
dictatorship had come to be quite obnoxious to the rest of the Hemi-
sphere. In 1962, the O.A.S. declared Castro-type communism to be
incompatible with the institutions of the Western Hemisphere. Thus, in
the Dominican Republic, the O.A.S. was confronted with a situation
which meant, in the first instance, a blood bath and, secondly, a prospect
that there would evolve from that blood bath either a Trujillo-type
dictatorship or a Castro-type dictatorship. Therefore, the Hemisphere
took action to give the people of the Dominican Republic another
choice.
I doubt that either the United States or the O.A.S. has yet reached
the point of a doctrinal statement that the principle of self-
determination cannot be carried so far within a bloc as to permit a bloc
nation to deviate from the bloc. I would not say that the Dominican
affair could not be repeated, either in the Dominican Republic or in
some other country, but I can state, quite categorically, that I cannot
imagine this situation being repeated in three-fourths of the nations of
the Western Hemisphere.
There is one other fundamental difference between the O.A.S. action
in the Dominican Republic and the action of the Warsaw Pact in Czech-
oslovakia. In the one case, the O.A.S. was providing the people of the
Dominican Republic with a chance to determine their own political
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system, whereas, the Warsaw Pact was preventing the people of Czecho-
slovakia from determining their political system. The question of
whether this distinction makes any difference as a matter of law, I leave
to the rest of those present.
[Mr. Rusk then left the discussion due to another commitment.]
Mr. WILSON:
I feel that one can strongly disagree on factual grounds with Mr.
Rusk's interpretation of the 1960 O.A.S. sanction against Trujillo. This
sanction was not related to the right-to-left issue at all. That issue came
much later in 1965. It is regrettable that Mr. Rusk is not present to
perhaps dress out the context of his remarks and see if he was correctly
understood.
The 1960 O.A.S. sanction was taken against Trujillo because Trujillo
had attempted to assassinate President Betancourt of Venezuela and,
thus, had violated the cornerstone of the inter-American system: the
principle of nonintervention. It was on that ground alone, and not be-
cause of the rise of a dictatorship, that the O.A.S. wished to get rid of
Trujillo. The Latin American countries were willing to adhere to the
legal machinery that existed, namely a system of collective security
through a regional arrangement undertaken on the basis of treaties, etc.,
and put into operation by the requisite number of votes.
In 1965, there was an entirely different situation with the United
States unilateral perception of the Dominican Republic as a second
Cuba. The O.A.S. member nations voted to support the United States
only by a bare two-thirds majority. The Dominican Republic's vote
should have been disqualified for a conflict of interest, but it was
counted and carried the motion of support for the United States. On
factual grounds I do not see how a person can put together the O.A.S.
act against the Trujillo government of 1960 and the situation in 1965.
Mr. PAUST:
I disagree with the statement that international stability is supported
by status quo laws, whether such laws are regional or are of a wider
application, if in fact public frustrations or human expectations are
either ignored or openly suppressed within the reference region. Status
quo laws may perhaps make law itself unrealistic or of little utility
regarding conflict management in the future. All that may be gained by
supporting status quo laws which are unresponsive to needs is to post-
pone the conflict that will inevitably develop.
I also disagree with Professor Oglesby's statement that unilateral
action by a single state, unless in self-defense, is incontestably illegal.
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The efficacy of such a statement depends on the definition given to self-
defense. As an example, the United States helicopter prisoner rescue
effort in North Vietnam may have possible legal justifications other
than self-defense, such as retortion, reprisal, humanitarian intervention
and intervention to protect nationals. Thus, it is not necessarily incon-
testably clear that self-defense is the only legal ground of intervention.
Mr. OGLESBY:
My use of the term "self-defense" was perhaps categorical and an
unfortunate rhetorical device which I used to give emphasis to the ambi-
guities surrounding bloc intervention and United Nations use of force.
There is a great deal of ambiguity surrounding the use of force by a
regional organization. I consider self-defense to include reprisal, al-
though I am aware of the criticism directed toward the use of force by
reprisal under the United Nations system.
Mr. KEILING:
Mr. Oglesby, would the United States be justified in intervening in
Chile under the guise of that country's action being a threat to interna-
tional peace, where such actions are contrary to the bloc interest of the
O.A.S., and where it is realized that Chile has a democratic, elected
government? If so, then does the concept of sovereignty really not apply
to current international law?
Mr. OGLESBY:
I am keenly aware that perhaps the possibility of O.A.S. intervention
in communist take-over situations was not as broadly based as my paper
stated. If there were a peaceful revolution, as has come to take place in
Chile, and if that country voted to go communist, I doubt that the
O.A.S. would intervene directly with force. As my paper pointed out,
if the deviation from bloc interests came about as a result of machina-
tion by another bloc, suspected or otherwise, then I think the O.A.S.
would act more forcefully. In such a situation the O.A.S. has a commit-
ment to act forcefully, and since such a commitment came about as a
result of a regional treaty, it would override article 2, section 4 of the
United Nations Charter.
Mr. ANDERSON:
In his consideration of the bloc situation, Mr. Oglesby seems to be
setting forth a basis for a turn of international law to inter-regional law.
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Mr. Oglesby, would the ultimate solution of our problems be a con-
trolled force within regions?
Mr. OGLESBY:
I am a strong believer in the United Nations, and I was not particu-
larly happy with the conclusions made in my paper. Although I do not
see regionally controlled force as the ultimate solution, it is a realistic,
intermediary way of keeping peace in certain areas of the world until
such a time when the United Nations can assume a more useful role as
a worldwide organization.
Mr. CLUTE:
I would agree that Africa's problems are not immediately pressing,
but I think the African continent has conditions which are ripe for
conflict, as evidenced by the guerrilla warfare in the Congo and with
respect to the Mau Mau situation. In addition, it is important to note
the effect which an increased Soviet force in the Mediterranean, North
Africa and the Indian Ocean could have upon the strategic importance
of black Africa.
Mr. PAYNE:
While it may be said that African nations are now small and lacking
in capabilities, such an analysis ignores the very real problem of human
rights and the support of guerrilla activities in the southern part of
Africa. It has not been too many years since those who studied the
African countries were accused of studying an unimportant part of the
world. Today that is no longer true. Although the African nations may
not be capable of creating a severe international problem at this time,
the potential is certainly there. I am reminded of a West African prov-
erb cited by the Foreign Minister of Liberia: When you stop dancing,
you can hear the other animals in the jungle. This may well apply to
Africa.
Mr. ANDERSON:
Mr. Saliba, do you feel the development of a world food bank would
perhaps solve the problems of all third world countries?
Mr. SALIBA:
While I would note that I am a specialist on the Middle East, the
same problems are involved here. There is always a tendency to solve
problems by offering economic assistance to build a dam, to provide
additional food, etc. The food issue is not the major issue at all. People
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have always been able to find food to eat. The economic loss which a
people can endure in taking a particular course of action is supported
by a fundamental nourishment of the human psychology: honor. It is
ridiculous to think that Hanoi is going to release prisoners of war merely
because someone has offered them ten million dollars. A conflict cannot
be forestalled by providing economic assistance where honor is involved.
Mr. ScHou:
Mr. Oglesby, does your bloc model operationalize article 52, section
22 of the United Nations Charter?
Mr. OGLESBY:
The legal rationalization by each nation which uses my bloc model is
article 52 of the United Nations Charter. The difficulty arises in decid-
ing whether such action is peace-keeping or enforcement. At the present
time there is no third party or agency which can make a disinterested
decision on that distinction. In this way a legal loophole is developing
whereby regional organizations can still say they have acted pursuant
to the Charter all the' time, while they carry on enforcement actions
within the bloc.
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